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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

THE EVOLUTION OF LAWYER ADVERTISING:
WILL IT COME FULL CIRCLE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct govern advertising and
solicitation by lawyers. The Rules as originally adopted by South Carolina in 1990
generally permitted truthful lawyer advertising and direct solicitation, other than inperson solicitation, if the lawyer complied with various content and record-keeping
regulations. 2 These rules, which were prompted by a series of United States
Supreme Court decisions,3 reflected an evolution toward decreased regulation of

commercial speech in the legal profession. With only three exceptions,4 the
Supreme Court has been unwilling to grant states broad latitude to impose
regulations that bar particular methods of commercial communication. As a
consequence, South Carolina's Rules of Professional Conduct now permit direct-

1. See S.C. App. CT. R. 407, R. 7.1 to 7.5, amendedby Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19 (S.C.
Dec. 5, 1997).
2. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 7.1 to 7.5.
3. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (holding 30-day rule prohibiting
direct-mail solicitation of accident or disaster victims constitutional); Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus.
& Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 139 (1994) (holding that a lawyer may also
include Certified Public Accountant and Certified Financial Planner certifications on letterhead,
business cards, and public advertisements); Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of
II., 496 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1990) (holding a lawyer's inclusion of certification by the National Board
of Trial Advocacy was a protected form of commercial speech); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486
U.S. 466, 478-79 (1988) (holding that a state could not place an absolute ban on targeted, direct-mail
solicitation letters sent to people known to be in need of a specific legal service); Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,649,651-53 (1985) (holding that a state could not categorically
prohibit targeted newspaper advertisements that contain illustrations and legal advice, but that a state
could require lawyers advertising contingency fee cases to state the client's responsibility for costs and
the method of computing the fee); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 205 (1982) (holding Missouri's rule
delineating the precise areas ofpractice that could be contained in an advertisement unconstitutional);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (upholding a prophylactic ban on in-person
solicitation); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438-39 (1978) (holding that associational and political
communications are accorded more protection under the First Amendment than in-person solicitation
for pecuniary gain); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (holding blanket
prohibitions on lawyer advertising unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
4. See Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at 635 (recognizing a substantial interest in protecting the public
from "invasive conduct by lawyers" and in preserving confidence in the legal profession); Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 651-53 (holding, inter alia, that a state could require lawyers advertising contingency fee
cases to state the client's responsibility for costs and the method of computing the fee); Ohralik,436
U.S. at 468 (upholding a prophylactic ban on in-person solicitation).
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mail solicitation of prospective clients and targeted advertisements as well as more
general forms of advertising.5
In 1993 members of the South Carolina Bar expressed an interest in placing
further restrictions on lawyer advertising and solicitation." The South Carolina Bar
surveyed public attitudes toward lawyer advertising and made recommendations to
the South Carolina Supreme Court for changes in the advertising and solicitation
rules based upon the results Based on the materials submitted by the Bar, the
South Carolina Supreme Court amended the lawyer advertising rules and closely
followed the language ofthe Florida rules. On January 1, 1998, the newly amended
lawyer advertising and solicitation rules became effective." The new rules contain
fourteen new subsections primarily aimed at protecting the privacy of potential
recipients of advertisement or solicitation material and reducing the likelihood that
communications will be misleading.'0
Part II of this Article analyzes the evolution of constitutional law in the context
of lawyer advertising and solicitation from the 1970s to the present, focusing on
cases that have a direct bearing on South Carolina's newly amended rules. Part III
analyzes the fundamental changes, effects, and inherent ambiguities of South

5. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R. 7.1 to 7.5, amendedby Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19 (S.C.
Dec. 5, 1997).
6. Interview with Gregory B. Adams, Professor of Law at University of South Carolina School
of Law, in Columbia, S.C. (Mar. 23, 1998). A report was prepared by Harry M. Lightsey, Jr., Stephen
A. Spitz, and Robert M. Wilcox analyzing Iowa's lawyer disciplinary rules, focusing on their
constitutionality under CentralHudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. PublicServ. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). See REPORTTO THEHOUSE OF DELEGATES OFTHE S.C. BAR (submitted May 1994). Because

of constitutional concerns surrounding Iowa's strict lawyer advertising rules, South Carolina chose not
to follow Iowa's lead and proceeded down a less restrictive path. During this time, Went ForIt was
winding its way through the federal court system and South Carolina turned its attention to Florida's
lawyer advertising rules. See Petition of the South Carolina Bar Ex Parte,In re Lawyer Advertising
Rules, Exhibit C (Mar. 5, 1996).
7. See METROMARK, ADVERTISING AND REGULATED PROFESSIONS: REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA BAR (1995);

Petition of the South Carolina Bar Ex Parte,In re

Lawyer Advertising Rules (Mar. 5, 1996). Metromark, a market research firm employed by the South
Carolina Bar, had concluded an empirical study of lawyer advertising. The South Carolina Bar
presented the South Carolina Supreme Court with a petition to amend the lawyer advertising rules along
with a copy of the Florida rules and the Metromark study results. Id.at Exhibit D. The study showed:
(1) 56.5% of the survey group responded that lawyer advertising increased frivolous suits; (2) Only
40.6% agreed that contingent fee advertising promoted understanding of contingency fee concepts
regarding liability for expenses; (3) 16.2% agreed that lawyer advertising increases public confidence
in the profession; (4) 42.9% thought that some television advertisements were misleading; (5) 27.1%
thought that "some" of the advertisements mailed by lawyers were misleading; (6) 46.3% thought that
some yellow pages advertisements were misleading; and (7) 41.5% thought that some newspaper
advertisements were misleading. Id. at 20-28. The results of the study included comments by South
Carolinians, some of which are truly disparaging of lawyers. See, e.g., id. App. E, at 41 ("Lawyers are
money hungry, they sell their souls for the wrong things in life. Every time I see a commercial on TV,
I say to myself: 'This lawyer is more interested in the dollar than the client."').
8. Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997).
9. Id. at 28.
10. See id. at 19-28.
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Carolina's new regulations as well as their constitutionality.
II.BACKGROUND
A. Regulation of GeneralAdvertising
Prior to 1977 the American Bar Association (ABA) embraced the traditional
view that advertising was in bad taste and harmed the profession by incorporating
this view into the Canons of Professional Ethics." While Canon 27 permitted
lawyers to list biographical and informative data in "reputable law lists," only
factual information, such as the lawyer's name, address, telephone number, and date
of admission to the bar could be included in a listing.' 2
In 1977 the general prohibition on advertising was declared unconstitutional in
the seminal case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.3 The Supreme Court, citing
VirginiaState Board ofPharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,Inc., 4
for the proposition that advertising is commercial speech "which does 'no more than
propose a commercial transaction,""..5 struck down Arizona's blanket prohibition
on lawyer advertising.' 6 The lawyer in Bates advertised routine legal services at
"very reasonable fees."' 7 The Court's narrow holding was that a truthful
advertisement publicizing a lawyer's prices for routine legal services is protected
under the First Amendment and cannot be prohibited.' Therefore, Arizona's
blanket suppression of lawyer advertising was found to be unconstitutional.'
11. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs Canon 27 (1956),
COMPENDIUM OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 311,

reprinted in ABA
at 320-21 (1997).

Canon 27 provided in part:
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars,
advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not
warranted by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for professional
employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments ....and all
other like self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone ofourprofession

and are reprehensible; but the customary use of simple professional cards is not
improper.

Id. at 320.
12. Id. The American Bar Association adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
in 1969, which continued the general prohibitions against attorney advertising. Id. at 169-83. All states
demonstrated their support by adopting the Model Code by 1983. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN,
PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 15 (3d ed. 1989).
13. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
14. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
15. Id.at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)).
16. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
17. Id. at 354.
18. Id. at 384.
19. Id. at 383-84. The Court also pointed out that while advertisements may not contain all the
information necessary to select an attorney, the bar was empowered to correct advertising omissions
and inaccuracies through the "preferred remedy" of additional advertising disclosures. Id. at 375.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1998
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However, the Court noted in dicta that false, misleading, or deceptive
advertising, as well as in-person solicitation, was subject to restraint and that lawyer
claims regarding the quality of legal services could be regulated.20 In essence, the
Court indicated that while it was constitutionally permissible for states to regulate
lawyer advertising, blanket suppression oftruthful, non-deceptive advertising would
not be upheld if challenged.
The following year the Court decided Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass 'n,21 in
which it upheld an absolute prohibition on direct, in-person solicitation of
prospective clients.' The Court distinguished in-person solicitation from the print
advertisement inBates by statingthat in-person solicitation is "inherently conducive
to overreaching and other forms of misconduct. ' A person who is personally
solicited is "more vulnerable to influence"' than the recipient of a print
advertisement, who is "free to act upon it or not."' The Court allowed the
prophylactic ban on in-person solicitation to stand even without any evidence of
public harm.26
Many states acted upon the Court's indication in Bates that regulation of lawyer
advertising might be permitted under certain circumstances. The ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility was amended to list information that might properly
be included in lawyer advertising, excluding all other content.27 However, to many
states' dismay, the Court held such a rule to be unconstitutionally restrictive in In
re R.M.J2 8
R.MJ was the first lawyer advertising case analyzed under the Central
Hudson" test, which has become the standard test applied to all commercial speech
cases.3" Under this test, for commercial speech to be protected under the First
Amendment it "must concem lawful activity and not be misleading."'" If the

20. Id. at 383-84. The Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
In fact, because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services,
misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other
advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising. For example,
advertising claims as to the quality of services-a matter we do not address
today-are not susceptible of measurement or verification; accordingly, such
claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction.

ld. (footnote omitted).
21. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at468.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
Id. at457.
Id. at 464, 468.

27. See MODEL CODE OFPROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY EC 2-8, DR2-10I, &DR2-105 (1969),
reprintedin ABA CoMpENDim oFPRoFEssIoNALRESPONSIBILITYRULEs AND STANDARDS 156, 171,
177-79, 183-84 (1997).
28. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
29. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
30. Id. at 566.

31. Id. at 564.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/13
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government is attempting to regulate lawful, non-misleading commercial speech,
the governmental interest must be substantial and the regulation must directly
advance that governmental interest. 2 Finally, the regulation must be no more
extensive than necessary to achieve the governmental interest.3
Although finding the Missouri regulation to be overly restrictive, the Court
explicitly reaffirmed that states have the power to restrict inherently misleading
advertisements and advertising that is misleading in practice. 3 The Court also
carefully enunciated that a state may not place an absolute ban on non-misleading
commercial speech or potentially misleading commercial speech if the information
can be presented in a non-deceptive manner.35
B. Regulation ofDirectSolicitation
At this point in the evolution of lawyer advertising, general, blanket

prohibitions of potentially misleading information clearly would not pass

constitutional scrutiny; the preferred method was to require disclaimers or
explanations.36 Of the four cases that the Court had considered, three involved
advertisements and one involved in-person solicitation. Only Ohralik, which
involved aprophylactic prohibition on in-person solicitation, survived constitutional
scrutiny.37
In Shapero v. Kentucky BarAss'n 38 the Court considered another method of
lawyer advertising-direct mail solicitation. Mr. Shapero, a lawyer, proposed to
send targeted letters containing no false or misleading information to people whose
homes were being foreclosed.3 9 The Court analyzed Kentucky's absolute ban on
targeted solicitation letters under the CentralHudson test and found Kentucky had
not presented a substantial state interest sufficient to justify a total ban on such
letters.4" The Court indicated far less restrictive alternatives were available to
prevent any potential deception, and it pointed out several constitutionally
permissible regulations states could impose to prevent possible deception." In

32. Id.

33. Id.
34. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
35. Id.
36. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977); R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 203.
37. See Ohralikv. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978) (upholding a prophylactic ban
on direct in-person solicitation).
38. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).

39. Id. at 469-70.
40. Id. at 476. Kentucky's asserted state interest was that a targeted direct-mail letter was simply
.'Ohralikinwriting' and the potential for abuse in this type of solicitation demanded an absolute ban.

Id. at 474-75.
41. Id. at 476-77. The Court recognized that direct-mail solicitations could be deceiving to the
recipient in various ways and indicated that a state could (1) require lawyers to submit direct mailings
to a reviewing agency, (2) require lawyers to submit documentation supporting the lawyer's belief that
the particular individual was in need of specific legal services and the manner in which the lawyer came

Published by Scholar Commons, 1998
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distinguishing Shapero from Ohralik,the Court noted that "[t]he relevant inquiry
is not whether there exist potential clients whose 'condition' makes them
susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of communication poses a
serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility."42
Allowing direct solicitation of prospective clients raised anew concerns that
lawyers might overreach or intrude inappropriately into the affairs of citizens,
harming public respect for the legal system. In 1990, Florida adopted a thirty-day
rule that prevented plaintiffs' attorneys from sending solicitation mail to accident
victims or their families for thirty days following an accident or disaster.43 The
thirty-day rule led to the landmark case of FloridaBar v. Went For It, Inc.44 The
Eleventh Circuit had affirmed a District Court's holding that the Florida rule
violated the First Amendment. 45 The court of appeals based its holding in large part
on the language ofShapero.46 The Florida Bar petitioned for a writ of certiorari and
the United States Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held the rule
was constitutional. 7
Classifying the Central Hudson test applicable to commercial speech as
".intermediate' scrutiny," 4 the Court in Went For It found Florida's interest in
protecting its citizens' privacy during times of great emotional distress to be a
substantial state interest.49 With the first prong satisfied, the Court, applying Central
Hudson's second prong, 0 held that Florida had demonstrated that the regulation

to possess this information, and (3) require lawyers to mark the letter as an advertisement. Id.

42. Id.at 474. The Court then went on to explain that because in-person solicitation is obviously
conducive to overreaching, undue influence, invasion of privacy, and fraud, a state is permitted to
regulate the practice; in contrast, directed letters present fewer opportunities for undue influence,
overreaching, fraud, and invasion of privacy. Id. at 475-76.
43. FLA. STAT. ANN. R. 4-7.4(b)(1) (West 1994). This rule provides in part:
A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, ... a written
communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional
employment if:
(A) the written communication concerns an action for personal injury or
wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the
person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative ofthat person,
unless the accident or disaster occurred more than 30 days prior to the
mailing of the communication ....
Id. R. 4-7.4(b)(1)(A).
44. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
45. McHenry v. Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038, 1045 (11th Cir. 1994).
46. Id. at 1044.
47. Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at 635.
48. Id. at 623.
49. Id. at 625.
50. The CentralHudson test originally consisted of a four-part analysis. See supranotes 31-33
and accompanying text. The analysis has been shortened to three prongs. "First, the government must
assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation; second, the government must demonstrate that
the restriction on commercial speech directly and materially advances that interest; and third, the
regulation must be 'narrowly drawn,"' Went ForIt, 515 U.S. at 624.
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directly and materially advanced Florida's substantial state interest.51In analyzing
the third prong, the Court took care to enunciate the principle that commercial
speech regulations do not have to take the form of the least restrictive means
available to advance the state's interest; rather, the "fit" need only be reasonable in
relation to the interest being served. 2 With this analysis, the majority easily
concluded that the thirty-day rule was "reasonably well tailored to its stated
objective." 3 In reaching this holding, the Court emphasized that the time period was
brief and that lawyers still had other advertising avenues available to reach accident
victims and their families during this brief period. 4
Even though the Supreme Court, with three very narrow exceptions, has
consistently struck down rules restricting lawyer advertisements, the Court has also
consistently reiterated that states can regulate advertisements provided the
regulation meets the CentralHudson test and that states can categorically prohibit
inherently misleading advertisements. Throughout the eighteen years following
Bates, the Court has expressed concern for communications that naturally lend
themselves to overreaching, undue influence, and invasion of privacy. Indeed, this
was the very reason the Court upheld the absolute ban on in-person solicitation in
Ohralik.In Went ForIt, however, the Court indicated that it was willing to expand
the states' abilityto regulate lawyer advertising and solicitation by upholding abrief
ban on targeted, direct-mail letters. The Court paid particular attention to the
statistical and anecdotal evidence compiled by Florida in support of the regulation
and based its holding on the privacy interest. Given this signal, it appears that states
may now constitutionally regulate lawyer advertising and solicitation, so long as the
regulation is tied to and directly advances the privacy interest.55
III. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES
A. South CarolinaRules of ProfessionalConduct: Structure andFocus
The South Carolina amendments further regulate false or misleading

51. Id. at 628. In 1989, the Florida Bar completed a study that had been conducted to analyze the
effects lawyer advertising and solicitation had on the public's opinion of lawyers. The survey included
statistical and anecdotal evidence supporting the Florida Bar's conclusion that Floridians found directmail solicitation in the wake of an accident or disaster to be an intrusion into their privacy. Id.at 620,
626. The Court noted that "[t]he anecdotal record mustered by the Bar is noteworthy for its breadth and
detail." Id. at 627.
52. Id. at 632. However, this is not the equivalent of "rational basis review" because the
restriction must still be narrowly tailored to achieve the state's substantial interest. The Court will
consider the existence of "'numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on
commercial speech' when analyzing "'whether the 'fit' between ends and means is reasonable."' Id.
(quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993)).
53. Id. at 633.
54. Id. at 633-34.
55. Id. at 625.
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communications, impose additional required disclosures, amend record-keeping
requirements, and restrict solicitation methodology and content. 6 The changes
affect not only direct solicitation but also many forms of common advertising,

especially those advertisements that refer in any way to the amount of or method of
computing fees. Rule 7.1 ofthe South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct is the
basic rule that governs all lawyer communications regarding services, including
advertising."' Rule 7.2 directly governs lawyer advertising," and Rule 7.3 is
directed at solicitation. 9 Rule 7.1 prohibits lawyers from making "false, misleading,
deceptive, or unfair communications" about themselves or their services.' The Rule
then provides examples of what constitutes a false, misleading, deceptive, or unfair
communication in subsections (a) through (d).6' Rule 7.2 permits lawyer
advertising, subjectto Rule 7.1's prohibitions, through any public media and written
or recorded communications.6 2 The nine subsections, five of which are new,
regulate and restrict the advertising content and require lawyers to maintain
advertising records.63 Rule 7.3(a) contains the blanket prohibition of in-person
solicitation for pecuniary gain,' and subsection 7.3(b) prohibits direct written or
recorded solicitation in five specific instances, three of which are new. 6 Rule 7.3(c)
has not been amended in any way, but subsections (d) through (h) were added and
focus on the permissible methods of mailing direct communications, the form of
the communications, and the necessary disclosures.6
B. The Amendments
1. Testimonials,Self-laudatoryStatements,and UnjustifledExpectations
Rule 7.1(d) now prohibits lawyers from sending any communication that

56. See Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997).
57. Id.
58. Id.at 20. Rule 7.2(a) now provides that "[s]ubject to the requirements of this Rule and Rules
7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through the public media, such as telephone directory,
legal directory, newspaper, or other periodical; outdoor advertising; radio or television; or though
written or recorded communication." Id.
59. Id. at 22-25.
60. Id. at 19.
61. See id.
62. See Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19, 20-21 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997).
63. For example, Rule 7.2(b) provides that "[a] copy or recording of an advertisement shall be
kept by the lawyer for two (2) years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where
it was disseminated." Id. at 20.
64. Rule 7.3(a) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone contact solicit
professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior
professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary
gain." Id. at 22.

65. Id. at 22-23. Rule 7.3(b)(3)-(5) isnew.
66. Id. at 24-25.
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contains testimonials regarding the quality of services or results obtained;67 Rule
7.2(f) prohibits lawyers from using "merely self-laudatory" statements and
statements characterizing the quality of legal services. 8 These rules may best be
viewed as corollaries to Rule 7.1(b). Rule 7.1(b), adopted by South Carolina in its
current form in 1990,69 provides that a communication which "[i]s likely to create
an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies
that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct or other law" violates the prohibition on false, misleading, deceptive, or

unfair communications." This subsection is aimed at preventing lawyers from
making claims regarding their successes and abilities, which may create unjustified
expectations in prospective clients.7'
While the United States Supreme Court has never directly reviewed a similar
regulation, the Court has expressed its disapproval of advertising claims that
reference the quality of legal services.72 In Bates the Court reserved the issue of
advertising claims regarding quality of legal services, but stated that because claims
as to quality "are not susceptible of measurement or verification;... such claims
may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction." Essentially, the Court
recognizes that advertisements regarding the quality of legal services are susceptible
to inherently misleading claims. These claims may lead prospective clients to the
conclusion that a lawyer's successes are directly related to the lawyer's skills and
are unrelated to the facts and legal issues presented in each case.
Rule 7.1(d) prevents lawyers from using testimonials regarding the quality of
legal services or results obtained in communications.74 The Comment to Rule 7.1
makes clear that client endorsements are prohibited because of the likelihood of
creating "unjustified expectations," which are a violation under Rule 7.1(b)." A
testimonial is defined as "a statement testifying to a person's qualifications,
character, etc. or to the merits of some product, service, etc."76 Amended Rule
7.1 (d) makes the prohibition definite and precludes circumvention by having a nonclient pronounce a lawyer's abilities or successes.
CentralHudson does not appear to present a constitutional bar to Rule 7.1 (d).
The rule prohibits only testimonials that concern the results obtained or the quality
of services provided and is best viewed as an extension of Rule 7.1 (b)'s prohibition
against communications that would create an unjustified expectation about the

67. Id. at 19.
68. Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19,20 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997).
69. See supra text accompanying note 2.

70. S.C. App. CT. R. 407, IK7.1(b).
71. See id. cmt.
72. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,479 (1988); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,20001 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977).
73. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84.
74. See Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997).
75. Id. at 19-20 cmt.
76. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DiCTiONARY 1383 (3d ed. 1994).
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results of legal services." South Carolina has a substantial interest in preventing the
dissemination of misleading claims. Moreover, the restriction on testimonials
appears to directly and materially advance that interest. As the United States
Supreme Court has recognized, statements concerning the quality of legal services
are so likely to be misleading that states may constitutionally regulate these types
of advertisements.7 8
Rule 7.2(f), which prohibits "merely self-laudatory" statements, appears
contradictory, or at least ambiguous, on its face. A laudatory statement is generally
defined as one that expresses praise. 79 In a broad sense, all advertising involves selflaudatory statements."0 The sole purpose of advertising is to draw favorable
attention to a product or service being sold,8' with the advertisement being intended
to set the product or service apart from other similar services or products in the
market. While advertisements that are strictly limited to certain objective
information such as the advertising lawyer's name, location, and areas of practice
would not reach the level of self-laudatory statements, any reference to the lawyer's
abilities or successes could violate a broad reading ofthis rule. Even statements of
pure fact, such as graduation summa cum laude, awards received, or academic
institution attended are in some degree self-laudatory. For example, a graduate of
Harvard Law School may advertise that fact to draw attention to the presumably
favorable credential of having attended an Ivy League law school. However, the
South Carolina Supreme Court probably did not intend to include such factual
information in the ban on self-laudatory statements. An appropriate distinction
might be drawn between subjective statements regarding the quality of legal

services and objective statements of verifiable facts. The distinction would be
similar to that made by the United States Supreme Court in Peel v. Attorney
Registration & Disciplinary Commission of llinois,82 in which the lawyer's
statement that he was admitted to the National Board of Trial Advocacy merely
permitted an "inference of quality," but was not an opinion or statement regarding
83
quality.
The overall effect becomes apparent once the three rules are read in
conjunction. The creation of unjustified expectations, either through self-laudatory
statements or through testimonials, violates the ban on false, misleading, deceptive,
or unfair communications. However, if self-laudatory statements are verifiable facts,

77. The new version of Rule 7.1 does not preclude the use of testimonials that do not contain
references to the lawyer's history of successful cases. So long as the testimonial makes no mention of
favorable verdicts, amounts of awards, or the lawyer's abilities, and does not otherwise create an
unjustified expectation, the testimonial should not violate the rule.
78. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
79. WEBSTER's NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 764 (3d ed. 1994).
80. Except, of course, advertisements merely listing the lawyer's name, address, telephone
number, and areas of practice.
81. See WEBsTER's NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 20 (3d ed. 1994) (defining the verb "advertise").
82. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
83. Id. at 101.
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without reference to the quality of the attorney's services, they should not violate
the rule. A lawyer's collegiate successes, years of experience, certifications, and
professional awards all permit an inference of the lawyer's abilities, but the

advertising lawyer is merely allowing the consumer to make, or not make, that
inference. The lawyer who includes this type of information in an advertisement is
doing no more than the lawyer in Peel. Thus, inclusion of these verifiable facts
should not be prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who advertises a favorable
win-loss record, a string of large damages awards for clients, or who claims to be
the best personal injury lawyer in the state is violating the rules.' These types of
claims, even though some may be factual and verifiable, are more likely to create
unjustified expectations in the prospective client and affirmatively relate to the
quality of services that the advertising lawyer can provide.
Under CentralHudson,the primary question is whether the regulation is drawn
narrowly to achieve the state's substantial interest in protecting consumers from
misleading or deceptive advertising. 5 Under the new South Carolina rule, all selflaudatory statements are banned, including truthful, non-misleading self-laudatory
statements that do not affirmatively characterize the quality of the advertising
lawyer's services. Reading the rule broadly, Rule 7.2(f) may violate the narrowly
tailored prong of the CentralHudson test. Although the fit between the means and
the end need only be reasonable, 6 a more narrowly tailored rule could easily be
drafted so that only self-laudatory statements that concern the quality of services or
results obtained are banned.
Additionally, an apparent contradiction arises upon a careful reading of the
Comments to Rules 7.1 and 7.2. While the rules contain an express prohibition on
testimonials regarding a lawyer's quality of services or results, the rules also
expressly permit lawyers to include in their advertisements the names of clients
regularly represented. 7 The use of a client's name, without more, may in some

84. The comment to amended Rule 7.1 provides in pertinent part:
Whatever means are used to make known a lawyer's services, statements about
them should be truthful. The prohibition in paragraph (b) of statements that may
create "unjustified expectations" and the prohibition in paragraph (d)of
testimonials would ordinarily preclude advertisements about results obtained on
behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage award or the lawyer's record
in obtaining favorable verdicts, and advertisements containing client
endorsements. Such information may create the unjustified expectation that
similar results can be obtained for others without reference to the specific factual
and legal circumstances.
Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19, 20 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997).
85. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564-65

(1980).
86. Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995).

87. See Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19, 19-20, 21-22 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997). The comment to
Rule 7.1 states that a client endorsement is ordinarily precluded because of the prohibition against
creating unjustified expectations. Id. at 19-20. The Comment to Rule 7.2 states that advertising
materials may contain the "names of references and, with their consent, names of clients regularly
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instances be sufficient to create potentially unjustified expectations in prospective
clients. However, an appropriate distinction between inferences and direct
statements of quality may be drawn here as well. If a law firm advertises that it
regularly represents an international company, a prospective client may well infer
that the firm has the requisite expertise to successfully represent similar clients.
However, the advertising law firm is not making an affirmative statement regarding
the quality of services that will be provided to the prospective client.
Viewed practically, the rules mostly impact small firms, practicing noncorporate law. Personal injury lawyers generally do not have "regular" personal
injury clients and are practically precluded from advertising "regularly" represented
clients. Although criminal defense lawyers may regularly representthe same clients,
the clients probably would not permit their names to be used in advertising
materials. In contrast, corporate lawyers that develop long-term attorney-client

relationships are free to advertise their clients' names because the rules do not
consider this information likely to create unjustified expectations. By amending the
rules to include prohibitions against merely self-laudatory statements and
testimonials concerning the quality of legal services, the supreme court was
apparently attempting to further limit a lawyer's ability to make statements that
would tend to create unjustified expectations. However, the additional rules do little
to clarify the preexisting prohibition contained in Rule 7.1(b) and may even raise
constitutional concerns under CentralHudson.
2. CollaborativeAdvertising andRequiredDisclosure
Rule 7.2(e) prohibits lawyers from paying for advertisements for other lawyers
unless the advertisement discloses the name and address of the lawyer who is
paying for the advertisement, the relationship between the two lawyers, and whether
the advertising lawyer will refer cases to the non-advertising lawyer.88 In essence,
a failure to disclose amounts to deception, is inherently misleading, and violates the
provisions of Rule 7.1. Therefore, Rule 7.2(e) is properly characterized as a
required disclosure rule.
Without disclosure, two types of agreements to advertise may now be precluded
by this amendment.89 First, two firms may not collaborate to screen and shuttle
promising cases to the non-advertising firm that specializes in a particular type of
case. Second, the amendment may also preclude a lawyer from referring all cases
which cannot be settled to a firm that specializes in trial practice. The advertising
disclosure requirements now mandated under the new amendment appear to be
specifically geared toward preventing deception of the consuming public by
permitting the consumer to decide whether to consult a lawyer who may ultimately
represented." Id. at 21.
88. Id. at 20.
89. These two scenarios are only the author's observations; other agreements between lawyers
may also be prohibited.
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pass the case on to another lawyer in a different firm.
Because the amendment is aimed at preventing deception and increasing the
accuracy of advertised information, Rule 7.2(e) appears to be constitutional. This
new subsection is narrowly tailored to eliminate potentially deceptive and

misleading advertisements and does not prohibit advertising collaboration. The rule
merely requires accurate, truthful disclosure, as the Court has indicated its
preference for on several occasions, so that the public has accurate information on
which to select an attorney. Finally, disclosure of the requisite information is not
unduly burdensome because it can easily be conveyed in the advertisement.
Rule 7.3(h) 9 is the direct-mail counterpart of Rule 7.2(e) and should pass
constitutional scrutiny also. Although this rule is clearly applicable to lawyers that
send direct solicitation letters to potential clients and do not intend to handle the
matter, the rule also seems to have a hidden application. If a law firm's senior
partner no longer practices law, or handles matters only for a select number of
clients, and yet sends out solicitation letters to potential clients, then the soliciting
partner will now presumably have to disclose that another lawyer will handle the
potential client's matter.
3. Fee Disclosures
The addition of Rule 7.2(g)9 is undoubtedly directed toward plaintiffs' lawyers
that advertise "no recovery, no fee." This amendment requires lawyers whose
advertisements include information regarding fees to disclose whether clients are
liable for expenses as well as fees and the method of computing the fee.' "No
recovery, no fee" advertisements are inherently misleading because they fail to
disclose that personal injury clients are normally required to pay the expenses of
handling a case, regardless of whether the client obtains a settlement or verdict.
In Zauderer v. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel 3 the United States Supreme
Court upheld Ohio's requirement that a lawyer who advertises contingency fee
cases must disclose the method of computing costs and the client's responsibility

90. Id. at 24-25. Rule 7.3(h) provides:
If a lawyer knows that a lawyer other than the lawyer whose name or
signature appears on the communication will actually handle the case or matter,
or that the case or matter will be referred to another lawyer or law firm, any
written communication concerning a specific matter shall include a statement so
advising the potential client.
Id.
91. Id. at 20-21. Rule 7.2(g) provides that "[e]very advertisement that contains information about
the lawyer's fee shall disclose whether the client will be liable for any expenses in addition to the fee
and, if the fee will be a percentage of the recovery, whether the percentage will be computed before
deducting the expenses." Id.
92. Id.

93. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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for costs regardless ofthe outcome.94 The Court noted that the phrase "no recovery,
no fee" could easily mislead laypersons unaware of the technical, legal distinction
between legal fees and costs.95 The Court carefully drew a distinction between
disclosure requirements that compel lawyers to include more information and
absolute prohibitions on commercial speech.96 The Court warned that overly
burdensome disclosure requirements could run afoul of the First Amendment;
therefore, the Court limited its holding on the disclosure issue to those instances in
which disclosures were "reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing
deception of consumers."97 Hence, the Court introduced a second test that is
applicable to lawyer commercial speech. While regulations limiting a lawyer's
commercial speech are analyzed underthe CentralHudsontest, required disclosures
are subject to a less exacting test, under which disclosure requirements, if not
unduly burdensome, need only be reasonably related to preventing deception.98
Even though a state's interest in preventing deception is identical under both tests,
disclosure requirements do not have to be narrowly tailored to achieve the state
interest, whereas restrictions on commercial speech must be narrowly tailored.
Under Rule 7.2(g), it appears that a lawyer has three alternatives when
advertising contingency fee rates: (1) If the advertisement states "no recovery, no
fee," the lawyer must disclose the method of computing the lawyer's fee and that
the client will be liable for expenses, regardless of the outcome of the case, if that
is the attorney's practice; (2) The advertisement may state "no recovery, no fee,"
and indicate that the client, regardless of the outcome of the case, will not be
responsible for any expenses, but the lawyer must also include the method of
computing the fee if a recovery is obtained; or (3) The lawyer may completely
eliminate any reference to fees. Rule 7.2(g) applies to all forms of advertising, not
just television commercials.' Because the rule contains no requirements as to the
form of the disclosure required, small typefaces or short appearances on screen of
the required information may suffice. To more effectively address the deception
problem, the rules might be further revised to require that television commercials
include an oral disclosure and print advertisements include a disclosure printed in
a type size as large as the main body of the advertisement.
The amendments to Rule 7.2 also include a rule regarding advertisements that
provide other fee information. Rule 7.2(h),"'0 which requires lawyers to honor

94. Id. at 653.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 652-53.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651.
Id.

99. Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19, 20 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997).
100. Idat 21. Rule 7.2(h) provides:
A lawyer who advertises a specific fee or range of fees for a particular service
shall honor the advertised fee or fee range for at least ninety (90) days following
dissemination of the advertisement, unless the advertisement specifies a shorter
period; provided that a fee advertised in a publication which is issued not more
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/13
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advertised fees for a specified period, is directed toward preventing deceptive
advertising. Obviously, if a lawyer advertised specific fees for specific legal
services and then failed to honor the advertised price, a consumer would be
deceived. Under Central Hudson, this amendment should pass constitutional
scrutiny. Not honoring an advertised price is deceptive; thus, the state may
constitutionally regulate this form of advertising. The state's interest in protecting

consumers from deceptive or potentially deceptive advertisements has been
recognized repeatedly,' ° and the regulation is narrowly drawn to meet this
substantial state interest. The amendment merely requires a lawyer to honor an
advertised fee for ninety days unless the lawyer has specified otherwise in the
advertisement." °2 Thus, the ninety-day period is a default rule that lawyers are able
to opt out of by merely including appropriate limiting language."° In light ofJustice
O'Connor's opinion in Went For It, this ninety-day time period would likely be
construed as reasonably well tailored" because it is brief and merely a default
provision.
When a publication is disseminated annually, the lawyer must honor the price
for a year following publication. ° This rule was included to address such
publications as the yellow pages and annual legal directories. A lawyer has no optout provision here and must honor the advertised fee for a year. " Nevertheless, the
provision probably passes constitutional muster because the one-year period is
consistent with reasonable consumer expectations for advertisements in an annual
publication. Ultimately, however, advertisements in the yellow pages that include
specific fees or a range of fees are uncommon; therefore, this portion of the
amendment will probably have little impact on lawyer advertising.

than annually, shall be honored for one (1) year following publication.

Id.
101. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar ofArizona, 433 U.S. 350,382 (1977) ("Advertising thatis false,
deceptive, or misleading of course is subject to restraint.").
102. Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19, 21 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997); see also Texans Against
Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar ofTexas, 888 F. Supp. 1328, 1357 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (holding, inter alia,
that requiring an advertised fee to be honored for a specified time period, unless otherwise stated in the
advertisement, is not an unduly burdensome disclosure requirement and merely ensures that the
advertised fee will be the actual fee paid by the potential client.)
103. For example, the following language should be sufficient to opt out of the default timeperiod of ninety days: "The advertised fee shall be honored for the next thirty days."
104. The ninety day period may best be viewed as the equivalent of the Uniform Commercial
Code's firm offer. Section 2-205 provides that
[a]n offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by its
terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or ifno time is stated for a reasonable time,
but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months ....
U.C.C. § 2-205 (1995).
105. Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19, 21 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997).
106. Id.
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4. GeographicDisclosures
Rule 7.2(i) requires lawyers to disclose the city or town where the lawyer who
will perform the advertised work principally practices. 7 The rule is directed toward
preventing possible deception of potential clients in three respects. First, lawyers
advertising on television reach a wide audience and without the disclosure, viewers
may be misled into believing the lawyer has a law office in their town, when the
office is in a city miles away. Second, the rule prevents lawyers and firms with
satellite offices from advertising legal services that are not available in the satellite
offices.' Finally, the rule also encompasses lawyers that have satellite offices
which are not staffed full-time. The rule appears to be targeted at preventing
deception of the public, rather than sophisticated business clients. For example,
sophisticated business clients presumably understand that a state-wide firm may
only handle specific matters in specific offices. The amendment appears to be
constitutional because it is a required disclosure rule rather than a rule prohibiting
speech. As the Court held in Zauderer, disclosure requirements will withstand
constitutional scrutiny so long as they are "reasonably related to the State's interest

in preventing deception of consumers."'0 9 The Court specifically stated that
"[b]ecause the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirements are
substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed, we do
not think it appropriate to strike down such requirements merely because other
possible means by which the State might achieve its purpose can be
hypothesized."" 0 A court is unlikely to find the disclosure requirements of Rule
7.2(i) to be unduly burdensome because the lawyer can use simple language such
as "Principal office located in Columbia, South Carolina," to meet the rule's
requirements.
5. Written SolicitationRestrictions
South Carolina's new Rule 7.3(b)(3).. is essentially the same as the rule at
107. Id. Rule 7.2(i) provides in part that "[a]ll advertisements shall disclose the geographic
location, by city or town, of the office in which the lawyer ...
who will actually perform the services
advertised principally practice[s] law. If the office location is outside a city or town, the county in
which the office is located must be disclosed." Id.
108. Often satellite offices do not provide legal services to the same extent as the principal office.
109. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
110. Id. at 652 n.14.
111. Order, Davis Adv. Sh.No. 34, at 19,22-23 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997). Rule 7.3(b)(3) provides:
A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from aprospective client
by direct written or recorded communication or by in-person, telephone,
telegraph, or facsimile contact if... [t]he solicitation concerns an action for
personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster
involving the person solicited or a relative of that person unless the accident or
disaster occurred more than thirty (30) days prior to the solicitation.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/13
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issue in FloridaBar v. Went For It, Inc."2 In Went For It the Court held the rule
was constitutional based on the anecdotal and statistical survey results Florida

presented in support of its substantial state interest"' and as proof that the rule
would directly and materially advance that state interest." 4 The State's burden of
proving the regulation directly and materially advances a substantial state interest
"'is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body
seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the
harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a
material degree."' 5 However, the Court did note that a state does not necessarily
have to conduct a survey resulting in statistical and anecdotal evidence to sustain
a commercial speech restriction." 6
South Carolina also conducted a survey, acquiring statistical and anecdotal
evidence of South Carolinians' views of lawyers and their advertising practices." 7
However, the South Carolina survey did not directly address whether the
participants had been recipients of targeted, direct-mail solicitation in the wake of
an accident or disaster,"' and it did not contain the same quality or quantity as the
Florida Bar survey results. While dicta in Went ForIt indicates a state may be able
to sustain a rule by relying on another state's statistical and empirical evidence," 9
112. 515 U.S. 618 (1995); see supra note 43.
113. Went Fort,515 U.S. at 625. Florida had a substantial state interest in protecting the privacy
of Florida citizens in times of personal distress. The Court quoted several respondents to the survey.
For example, one irate citizen wrote, '"I consider the unsolicited contact from you after my child's
accident to be of the rankest form of ambulance chasing and in incredibly poor taste . . Id. at 628.
114. Id. at 628.
115. Id. at 626 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (quoting
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993))).
116. Id. at 628. The Florida Bar's extensive two-year study consisted of hearings, surveys, and
reviews of public commentary. Id. at 620. The statistical data showed that lawyers mailed 700,000
direct-mail solicitation letters annually, with 40% being sent to accident victims or their families. Id.
at 626 (citing Summary of the Record in No. 74,987 (Fla.) on Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating
Lawyer Advertising, App. H, at 2). A survey also indicated that Floridians had '"negative feelings
about those attorneys who used direct mail advertising."' Id. at 626-27 (quoting Magid Assocs.,
Attitudes & Opinions Toward Direct Mail Advertising by Attorneys (Dec. 1987), Summary of the
Record, App. C(4), at 6). Moreover, the statistical data revealed that a significant percentage of the
Floridians surveyed resented the intrusion and felt lawyers engaging in direct mail solicitation were
attempting to ."take advantage of gullible or unstable people."' Id. at 627 (quoting Magid Assocs.,
Attitudes & Opinions Toward Direct Mail Advertising by Attorneys (Dec. 1987), Summary of the
Record, App. C(4), at 7). In addition, the survey included anecdotal evidence compiled from Florida
newspaper editorials on lawyers' outlandish solicitation tactics after accidents or disasters and
numerous comments by Florida citizens criticizing lawyers that engaged in direct-mail solicitation. Id.
at 627-28.
117. See supranote 7 and accompanying text.
118. The statistical results do not seem to support South Carolina's adoption of the 30-day rule.
See Petition of the South Carolina Bar Ex Parte,In re Lawyer Advertising Rules, Exhibit D, at 12
(Mar. 5, 1996). The statistical data compiled by Metromark relating to direct-mail indicated that over
half(55.5%) ofthe respondents had neverreceived a direct mail-advertisement, much less a direct-mail
solicitation letter in the wake of an accident or disaster.
119. Went ForIt,515 U.S. at 628.
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the Court held that Florida had met the burden ofproving that the restriction directly
and materially alleviated an intrusion ofprivacy and was therefore constitutional.2 0
However, the Comment to South Carolina's Rule 7.3 parallels the United States
Supreme Court's language when discussing the reason for the thirty-day
restriction.' The Comment states that the public considers
direct solicitation in the immediate wake of an accident as an intrusion on
the personal privacy and tranquility of citizens. The 30-day restriction...
is meant to forestall the outrage and irritation with the legal profession
engendered by crass commercial intrusion by attorneys upon a citizen's
personal grief in a time of trauma.'
The Comment also carefully labels the time period as "brief" and notes that other
advertising alternatives exist." Even though many lawyers and citizens probably
agree that direct-mail solicitation immediately following an accident or disaster is
in poor taste and constitutes an invasion of privacy, the rule may not be able to
withstand a constitutional challenge. Until the United States Supreme Court grants
certiorari to review a similar rule that is supported by another state's empirical
evidence, the question is left open whether the dicta in Went For It is controlling.
Rule 7.3 (b)(5) prohibits lawyers from soliciting a potential client with a mental,
physical, or emotional condition that would impair the person's ability to select a
lawyer. 4 The rule is basically an extension ofthe thirty-day rule because it seeks
to protect vulnerable consumers even if they have not been involved in an accident
or disaster.1" Rule 7.3(b)(5) appears to have been adopted to prevent lawyers from
engaging in direct solicitation that constitutes overreaching conduct. Even though
the Supreme Court has upheld a prophylactic ban on in-person solicitation, 6
"targeted, direct-mail solicitation" should not be prohibited simply because it
"presents lawyers with opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes."' 27 In Shapero
the Court noted that "[i]n assessing the potential for overreaching and undue
120. Id. at 635.
121. See Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19, 25-28 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997); Went ForIt, 515 U.S.
at 630-31, 633. The Court in Went ForIt recognized that"ft]he purpose of the 30-day targeted direct-

mail ban isto forestall the outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal profession that the practice
of direct solicitation only days after accidents has engendered." Id. at 631.
122. Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19, 26-27 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997).

123. Id. at 26-27.
124. Id. at 23. Rule 7.3(b)(5) provides that a lawyer may not directly contact aprospective client
inperson, by mail, by telephone, telegraph, or facsimile if"ft]he lawyer knows, or reasonably should
know, thatthe physical, emotional, ormental state ofthe person makes it unlikely that the person would
exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer." Id.
125. Potential clients protected by this rule may include those arrested for a criminal violation,
mentally handicapped persons, and those who have experienced a traumatic event, other than an
accident or disaster.
126. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,464-65 (1978).
127. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,476 (1988).
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influence, the mode of communication makes all the difference."' 28 The Court then
went on to observe that targeted, direct-mail solicitation, as opposed to in-person
solicitation, does not involve the same potential for undue influence and
overreaching.' 29 Letters may simply be thrown away. As a result, they do not invade
the recipient's privacy any more than a general, at-large advertisement mailing. 3 '
Because Rule 7.3(b)(5) encompasses every form of solicitation,' the
amendment raises constitutional issues. Under Ohralikand Shapero,the rule could
constitutionally encompass in-person communications and possibly even recorded
and live telephone communications because the inherent possibilities of undue
influence and overreaching are more likely when the contact takes these forms.
However, while including direct-mail solicitation in the ban may be seen as over
inclusive, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that direct-mail
32
solicitation in the wake of an accident or disaster invades the recipient's privacy.
Rule 7.3(b)(5) logically extends this holding so that a direct-mail solicitation of a
person that cannot exercise reasonable judgment in retaining a lawyer constitutes
overreaching and perhaps even an invasion of privacy. '3 The rule requires that the
lawyer not engage in the prohibited activity when the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know of the potential client's physical or emotional state. Under the South
Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, "knows" and "reasonably" are defined
terms. 134 As a result, the rule will turn on what a reasonably prudent lawyer would
do in light of what has caused the recipient's impaired ability to make a reasonable
decision in retaining a lawyer.
Rule 7.3(b)(4) is the final amendment regarding direct solicitation of
prospective clients. 35 Rule 7.3(b)(4) supplements Rule 7.3(b)(1)-(2) 36 because it
prevents lawyers from soliciting prospective clients that are already represented by

128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 475.
Id.
Id. at 476.
See supranote 124.

132. Florida Barv. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995).
133. Cf.In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1273-75 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., concurring). In this case,
a lawyer had sent a direct solicitation letter to the family of an accident victim within days of the plane
crash. Justice Handler noted that the contested rule, which is virtually identical to the South Carolina
rule, was aimed at preventing overreaching and invasion of privacy. Id. at 1272.

134. S.C. APP. C.R. 407. "'Reasonable' or 'reasonably' when used inrelation to conduct by a
lawyer denotes the conduct ofa reasonably prudent and competent lawyer."Id. "'Knowingly,' 'known,'
or 'knows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred

from circumstances." Id.
135. Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19, 23 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997). Rule 7.3(b)(4) provides that
a lawyer shall not solicit a prospective client if"[t]he solicitation concerns a specific matter and the
lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, that the person solicited is represented by a lawyer in the
matter." Id.
136. Id. Rule 7.3(b)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not solicit a prospective client if "ft]he
prospective client had made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer." Id. Rule
7.3(b)(2) provides that a lawyer shall not solicit a prospective client if"[t]he solicitation involves
coercion, duress, harassment, fraud, overreaching, intimidation, or undue influence." Id.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1998
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counsel. Once a person has informed the lawyer that the person does not wish to
retain the lawyer, any further contact by the lawyer constitutes harassment.
Logically, if the prospective client has already retained counsel, the soliciting
lawyer's services are unwanted and any attempt to "steal" the client away from
previously retained counsel would appear to involve an element of harassment and
duress.' 37 Rule 7.3(b)(4) should pass constitutional scrutiny if challenged. The
CentralHudson test appears to be satisfied because the state's purpose is to prevent
lawyers from harassing South Carolinians that are already represented by counsel,
and the rule is narrowly tailored to prohibit solicitation only when the soliciting
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the prospective client has already
retained counsel. However, the rule does not preclude a lawyer from giving legal
advice to a person who is already represented by counsel, as long as the person
approaches the lawyer. In a recent South Carolina Bar Ethics Advisory Committee
Opinion,'38 the Committee opined that a lawyer may consult with a person who is
already represented by counsel, but who came to the second lawyer to discuss the
pending legal matter.' Therefore, the new rule only prohibits lawyers from
soliciting prospective clients already represented by counsel, but does not prohibit
lawyers from agreeing to represent a person, or giving legal advice to, a person
already represented when that person actively seeks out another lawyer.
6. Direct-MailSolicitationDisclosuresandAppearance
Rules 7.3(e)-(g) 40 dictate the appearance and content of direct-mail solicitation
letters and closely follow and supplement the Supreme Court's language in
Shapero.' In Shapero the Court noted that a state could constitutionally require a
lawyer sending a direct-mail solicitation letter to submit the letter to a reviewing
agency, together with documentation of how the lawyer learned of the prospective
client's legal problem.' Rule 7.3(f) is practically a verbatim recitation of this
language, but does not require the lawyer to submit the letter to a reviewing agency.
Rather, the lawyer must disclose to the recipient how the information regarding the

137. Perhaps a lawyer would attempt to solicit another lawyer's client by promising to charge a
lower fee for handling the matter.
138. See S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Adv. Op. 97-07 (1997), available in 1997 WL 582911.
139. Id. at*1.
140. Order, Davis Adv. Sh. No. 34, at 19, 24 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997). Rule 7.3(e) provides that
"[w]ritten communications mailed to prospective clients shall not be made to resemble legal pleadings
or other legal documents." Id. Rule 7.3(f) provides that "[a]ny written communication prompted by a
specific occurrence involving or affecting the intended recipient of the communication or a family
member shall disclose how the lawyer obtained the information prompting the communication." Id.
Rule 7.3(g) provides that "[a] written communication seeking employment by a specific prospective
client in a specific matter shall not reveal on the envelope, or on the outside of a self-mailing brochure
or pamphlet, the nature of the client's legal problem." Id.
141. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 477-78 (1988).
142. Id. at 476-77.
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specific legal problem was obtained.'43 Such a disclosure requirement will clearly
pass constitutional scrutiny in light of Shapero.
Rules 7.3 (e) and (g) prevent lawyers from disclosing the specific legal problem
on the outside of the envelope and from making the letter resemble a pleading.'"
These rules are designed to ensure the recipient's privacy and preclude any element
of fraud, duress, or deception'45 that may occur by leading recipients to believe that
they are already involved in a formal legal proceeding. These rules should not raise
any constitutional concerns because they regulate only the appearance of the
communication and not its content. South Carolina has a substantial interest in
protecting South Carolinians' privacy,'46 and Rule 7.3(g) decreases the potential for
deceiving the client in a narrowly drawn manner. In addition, a lawyer has no
cognizable interest in making a solicitation letter resemble a pleading.
7. Restrictions on MailingDirect Solicitations
Rule 7.3(d) mandates that all written solicitation communications be sent by
regular mail, rather than by any form of registered or certified mail. 47 Presumably,

this rule was adopted to prevent invading the recipient's privacy, much like the
presumed reason for adopting the thirty-day rule. However, the distinction between
regular mail and restricted delivery mail is unclear. Lawyers are permitted to send
direct-mail solicitation letters and this practice does not constitute an invasion of
privacy. Therefore, how does sending a direct-mail solicitation letter by restricted
delivery constitute an invasion of privacy? If the recipient's privacy interest is not
invaded by receiving regular U.S. mail, the same privacy interest should not be
invaded when the letter is sent by certified or registered mail. The recipient remains
free to throw the letter away without opening it. The only distinction is that the
recipient of certified mail must sign for the letter in the delivery person's presence.
However, no privacy interest appears to be invaded at that point. Indeed, in light of
the rules dictating that the envelope may not indicate the nature of the recipient's
possible legal problem' and the outside of the envelope must be marked with the
word "Advertisement,"' 4 9 no privacy interest appears to be raised at all. 5 ' Under

143. Order, Davis Adv. Sh.No. 34, at 19, 24 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997).

144. Id.
145. See id. at 25-27. The Comment to Rule 7.3 notes that "any solicitation which contains
information which is false, misleading, deceptive, or unfair, [or] which involves coercion, duress,
harassment, fraud, overreaching, intimidation, or undue influence ...is prohibited." Id. at 26.
146. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995).
147. Order, Davis Adv. Sh.No. 34, at 19, 24 (S.C. Dec. 5, 1997). Rule 7.3(d) provides that
"[w]ritten communications mailed to prospective clients shall be sent only by regular U.S. mail, not
by registered mail or other forms of restricted or certified delivery." Id.

148. Id.
149. Id. at 23. Rule 7.3(c)(1) requires every written or recorded communication to include "[t]he
words 'ADVERTISING MATERIAL,' printed in capital letters and in prominent type, [which] shall
appear on the front of the outside envelope and on the front of each page of the material." Id. Because
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this analysis, the rule may be infirm under CentralHudson because it does not
directly and materially advance South Carolina's interest in protecting its citizens'
privacy or preventing deception and duress.
IV. CONCLUSION

South Carolina's newly amended Rules ofProfessional Conduct contain rules
that appear to infringe upon lawyer's commercial speech and rules that easily pass
constitutional muster. Several rules may be unconstitutional because they are
unsupported by empirical or anecdotal evidence, and others may simply be too
broadly drawn to meet the CentralHudson test. The United States Supreme Court
has yet to decide whether a state, like South Carolina, can rely on the empirical
evidence of other states when drafting limitations on lawyer advertising. The rules
that will undoubtedly withstand constitutional challenges were adopted in light of
prior United States Supreme Court case law over the past twenty-one years. For
example, the rules requiring disclosures of contingency fee obligations, geographic
locations, and collaborative advertising merely seek to provide consumers with
more accurate information regarding the advertising lawyer's practice.
The amendments to the Rules ofProfessional Conduct were just as interesting
for what they failed to address as for what they did address. The amendments did
not address e-mail or the Internet and the jurisdictional implications inhering to
these forms of lawyer advertising and solicitation. Nevertheless, it would be
illogical to argue that a web page on the Internet does not constitute advertising and
thus is not subject to the lawyer advertising and solicitation rules. However, the
Internet does raise questions not easily answered by the recently amended rules on
advertising. For example, advertising across state lines via the Internet raises
jurisdictional questions. One answer is to adopt and enforce a nationwide code of
conduct for lawyers. Without such a code, South Carolina may soon have to amend
its rules on advertising as technology once more outstrips the law.
Wyn Bessent Ellis

a Federal Express, United Parcel Service, and Certified Mail envelope can all be marked with the above
quoted language, recipients will not be misled into believing that they are already involved in legal
proceedings when they receive a restricted delivery direct-mail solicitation. Once the recipients sign
for the mail, they remain free to throw it away because the envelopes are clearly marked as advertising
material.
150. See Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar of Texas, 888 F. Supp. 1328, 1361-62
(E.D. Tex. 1995). The district court struck down a similar Texas rule based on the United States
Supreme Court's language in Shapero that direct-mail solicitations pose much less risk of overreaching
and undue influence than do in-person solicitation. Id. at 1362. The court then observed that requiring
envelopes to be marked as an "Advertisement" would eliminate any possibility of intimidation. Id.
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